But if the congenial is only the
like, how will you get rid of the other argument, of the uselessness
of like to like in as far as they are like; for to say that what is
useless is dear, would be absurd? Suppose, then, that we agree to
distinguish between the congenial and the like-in the intoxication
of argument, that may perhaps be allowed.
Very true.
And shall we further say that the good is congenial, and the evil
uncongenial to every one? Or again that the evil is congenial to the
evil, and the good to the good; and that which is neither good nor
evil to that which is neither good nor evil?
They agreed to the latter alternative.
Then, my boys, we have again fallen into the old discarded error;
for the unjust will be the friend of the unjust, and the bad of the
bad, as well as the good of the good.
That appears to be the result.
But again, if we say that the congenial is the same as the good,
in that case the good and he only will be the friend of the good.
True.
But that too was a position of ours which, as you will remember, has
been already refuted by ourselves.
We remember.
Then what is to be done? Or rather is there anything to be done? I
can only, like the wise men who argue in courts, sum up the
arguments:-If neither the beloved, nor the lover, nor the like, nor
the unlike, nor the good, nor the congenial, nor any other of whom
we spoke-for there were such a number of them that I cannot remember
all-if none of these are friends, I know not what remains to be said.
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