And in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a
good and sometimes an evil to us, and sometimes neither one nor the
other?
To be sure.
But is there any reason why, because evil perishes, that which is
not evil should perish with it?
None.
Then, even if evil perishes, the desires which are neither good
nor evil will remain?
Clearly they will.
And must not a man love that which he desires and affects?
He must.
Then, even if evil perishes, there may still remain some elements of
love or friendship?
Yes.
But not if evil is the cause of friendship: for in that case nothing
will be the friend of any other thing after the destruction of evil;
for the effect cannot remain when the cause is destroyed.
True.
And have we not admitted already that the friend loves something for
a reason? and at the time of making the admission we were of opinion
that the neither good nor evil loves the good because of the evil?
Very true.
But now our view is changed, and we conceive that there must be some
other cause of friendship?
I suppose so.
May not the truth be rather, as we were saying just now, that desire
is the cause of friendship; for that which desires is dear to that
which is desired at the time of desiring it? and may not the other
theory have been only a long story about nothing?
Likely enough.
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