And the hated one, and not the hater, is the enemy?
Clearly.
Then many men are loved by their enemies, and hated by their
friends, and are the friends of their enemies, and the enemies of
their friends. Yet how absurd, my dear friend, or indeed impossible is
this paradox of a man being an enemy to his friend or a friend to
his enemy.
I quite agree, Socrates, in what you say.
But if this cannot be, the lover will be the friend of that which is
loved?
True.
And the hater will be the enemy of that which is hated?
Certainly.
Yet we must acknowledge in this, as in the preceding instance,
that a man may be the friend of one who is not his friend, or who
may be his enemy, when he loves that which does not love him or
which even hates him. And he may be the enemy of one who is not his
enemy, and is even his friend: for example, when he hates that which
does not hate him, or which even loves him.
That appears to be true.
But if the lover is not a friend, nor the beloved a friend, nor both
together, what are we to say? Whom are we to call friends to one
another? Do any remain?
Indeed, Socrates, I cannot find any.
But, O Menexenus! I said, may we not have been altogether wrong in
our conclusions?
I am sure that we have been wrong, Socrates, said Lysis.
Pages:
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30