The dependence of a will not absolutely good on the principle of
autonomy (moral necessitation) is obligation. This, then, cannot be
applied to a holy being. The objective necessity of actions from
obligation is called duty.
From what has just been said, it is easy to see how it happens that,
although the conception of duty implies subjection to the law, we
yet ascribe a certain dignity and sublimity to the person who
fulfils all his duties. There is not, indeed, any sublimity in him, so
far as he is subject to the moral law; but inasmuch as in regard to
that very law he is likewise a legislator, and on that account alone
subject to it, he has sublimity. We have also shown above that neither
fear nor inclination, but simply respect for the law, is the spring
which can give actions a moral worth. Our own will, so far as we
suppose it to act only under the condition that its maxims are
potentially universal laws, this ideal will which is possible to us is
the proper object of respect; and the dignity of humanity consists
just in this capacity of being universally legislative, though with
the condition that it is itself subject to this same legislation.
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