, to
become like him in this by exercise), and this constitutes our
respect. All so-called moral interest consists simply in respect for
the law.
But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must
determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect
expected from it, in order that this will may be called good
absolutely and without qualification? As I have deprived the will of
every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there
remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law
in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I
am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim
should become a universal law. Here, now, it is the simple
conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law
applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle
and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a
chimerical notion. The common reason of men in its practical
judgements perfectly coincides with this and always has in view the
principle here suggested. Let the question be, for example: May I when
in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it? I
readily distinguish here between the two significations which the
question may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether it is right, to
make a false promise? The former may undoubtedly of be the case.
Pages:
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39