It
recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and
principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say
they, we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced
from some original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or
deceitful. But neither is there any such original principle which
has a prerogative above others, that are self-evident and
convincing: or if there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but
by the use of those very faculties, of which we are supposed to be
already diffident. The Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever
possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not)
would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a
state of assurance and conviction upon any subject.
It must, however, be confessed, that this species of scepticism,
when more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense,
and is a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by
preserving a proper impartiality in our judgements, and weaning our
mind from all those prejudices, which we may have imbibed from
education or rash opinion. To begin with clear and self-evident
principles, to advance by timorous and sure steps, to review
frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately all their
consequences; though by these means we shall make both a slow and a
short progress in our systems; are the only methods, by which we can
ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and
certainty in our determinations.
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