This I observe in general, without pretending to draw any
advantage from it. I frankly submit to an examination of this kind,
and shall venture to affirm that the doctrines, both of necessity
and of liberty, as above explained, are not only consistent with
morality, but are absolutely essential to its support.
Necessity may be defined two ways, conformably to the two
definitions of cause, of which it makes an essential part. It consists
either in the constant conjunction of like objects or in the inference
of the understanding from one object to another. Now necessity, in
both these senses, (which, indeed, are at bottom the same) has
universally, though tacitly, in the schools, in the pulpit, and in
common life, been allowed to belong to the will of man; and no one has
ever pretended to deny that we can draw inferences concerning human
actions, and that those inferences are founded on the experienced
union of like actions, with like motives, inclinations, and
circumstances. The only particular in which any one can differ, is,
that either, perhaps, he will refuse to give the name of necessity
to this property of human actions: But as long as the meaning is
understood, I hope the word can do no harm: Or that he will maintain
it possible to discover something farther in the operations of matter.
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