* And if the
definition above mentioned be admitted; liberty, when opposed to
necessity, not to constraint, is the same thing with chance; which
is universally allowed to have no existence.
* Thus, if a cause be defined, that which produces any thing; it
is easy to observe, that producing is synonimous to causing. In like
manner, if a cause be defined, that by which any thing exists; this is
liable to the same objection. For what is meant by these words, by
which? Had it been said, that a cause is that after which any thing
constantly exists; we should have understood the terms. For this is,
indeed, all we know of the matter. And this constancy forms the very
essence of necessity, nor have we any other idea of it.
PART II.
75. There is no method of reasoning more common, and yet none more
blameable, than, in philosophical disputes, to endeavour the
refutation of any hypothesis, by a pretence of its dangerous
consequences to religion and morality. When any opinion leads to
absurdities, it is certainly false; but it is not certain that an
opinion is false, because it is of dangerous consequence. Such topics,
therefore, ought entirely to be forborne; as serving nothing to the
discovery of truth, but only to make the person of an antagonist
odious.
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