Now this is the very essence of necessity,
according to the foregoing doctrine.
73. But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the
question of liberty and necessity; the most contentious question of
metaphysics, the most contentious science; it will not require many
words to prove, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of
liberty as well as in that of necessity, and that the whole dispute,
in this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal. For what is
meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? We cannot
surely mean that actions have so little connexion with motives,
inclinations, and circumstances, that one does not follow with a
certain degree of uniformity from the other, and that one affords no
inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other. For
these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we
can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the
determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest,
we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical
liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a
prisoner and in chains. Here, then, is no subject of dispute.
74. Whatever definition we may give of liberty, we should be careful
to observe two requisite circumstances; first, that it be consistent
with plain matter of fact; secondly, that it be consistent with
itself.
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