Now we may observe, that, though, in reflecting on human actions, we
seldom feel such a looseness, or indifference, but are commonly able
to infer them with considerable certainty from their motives, and from
the dispositions of the agent; yet it frequently happens, that, in
performing the actions themselves, we are sensible of something like
it: And as all resembling objects are readily taken for each other,
this has been employed as a demonstrative and even intuitive proof
of human liberty. We feel, that our actions are subject to our will,
on most occasions; and imagine we feel, that the will itself is
subject to nothing, because, when by a denial of it we are provoked to
try, we feel, that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of
itself (or a Velleity, as it is called in the schools) even on that
side, on which it did not settle. This image, or faint motion, we
persuade ourselves, could, at that time, have been compleated into the
thing itself; because, should that be denied, we find, upon a second
trial, that, at present, it can. We consider not, that the fantastical
desire of shewing liberty, is here the motive of our actions. And it
seems certain, that, however we may imagine we feel a liberty within
ourselves, a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives
and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that
he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of
our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our
complexion and disposition.
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