When again they turn their
reflections towards the operations of their own minds, and feel no
such connexion of the motive and the action; they are thence apt to
suppose, that there is a difference between the effects which result
from material force, and those which arise from thought and
intelligence. But being once convinced that we know nothing farther of
causation of any kind than merely the constant conjunction of objects,
and the consequent inference of the mind from one to another, and
finding that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have
place in voluntary actions; we may be more easily led to own the
same necessity common to all causes. And though this reasoning may
contradict the systems of many philosophers, in ascribing necessity to
the determinations of the will, we shall find, upon reflection, that
they dissent from it in words only, not in their real sentiment.
Necessity, according to the sense in which it is here taken, has never
yet been rejected, nor can ever, I think, be rejected by any
philosopher. It may only, perhaps, be pretended that the mind can
perceive, in the operations of matter, some farther connexion
between the cause and effect; and connexion that has not place in
voluntary actions of intelligent beings.
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