Have we not reason, therefore, to affirm that all mankind have
always agreed in the doctrine of necessity according to the
foregoing definition and explication of it?
70. Nor have philosophers ever entertained a different opinion
from the people in this particular. For, not to mention that almost
every action of their life supposes that opinion, there are even few
of the speculative parts of learning to which it is not essential.
What would become of history, had we not a dependence on the
veracity of the historian according to the experience which we have
had of mankind? How could politics be a science, if laws and forms
of government had not a uniform influence upon society? Where would be
the foundation of morals, if particular characters had no certain or
determinate power to produce particular sentiments, and if these
sentiments had no constant operation on actions? And with what
pretence could we employ our criticism upon any poet or polite author,
if we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors
either natural or unnatural to such characters, and in such
circumstances? It seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage either
in science or action of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of
necessity, and this inference from motive to voluntary actions, from
characters to conduct.
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