The
contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can
never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the
same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to
reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a
proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation,
that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to
demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would
imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by
the mind.
It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity, to enquire what
is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real
existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our
senses, or the records of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is
observable, has been little cultivated, either by the ancients or
moderns; and therefore our doubts and errors, in the prosecution of so
important an enquiry, may be the more excusable; while we march
through such difficult paths without any guide or direction. They
may even prove useful, by exciting curiosity, and destroying that
implicit faith and security, which is the bane of all reasoning and
free enquiry. The discovery of defects in the common philosophy, if
any such there be, will not, I presume, be a discouragement, but
rather an incitement, as is usual, to attempt something more full
and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to the public.
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