Let all the different shades of that colour,
except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually
from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain that he will perceive
a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible that
there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous
colours than in any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for
him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up
to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been
conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be
of opinion that he can: and this may serve as a proof that the
simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the
correspondent impressions; though this instance is so singular, that
it is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit that for it
alone we should alter our general maxim.
17. Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only seems, in
itself, simple and intelligible; but, if a proper use were made of it,
might render every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that
jargon, which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings,
and drawn disgrace upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are
naturally faint and obscure: the mind has but a slender hold of
them: they are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas; and
when we have often employed any term, though without a distinct
meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea annexed to
it.
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