It
was important to Almagro's success that he should defeat this
junction. If to procrastinate was the policy of Vaca de Castro,
it was clearly that of Almagro to quicken operations, and to
bring matters to as speedy an issue as possible; to march at once
against Holguin, whom he might expect easily to overcome with his
superior numbers; then to follow up the stroke by the still
easier defeat of Alvarado, when the new governor would be, in a
manner, at his mercy. It would be easy to beat these several
bodies in detail, which, once united, would present formidable
odds. Almagro and his party had already arrayed themselves
against the government by a proceeding too atrocious, and which
struck too directly at the royal authority, for its perpetrators
to flatter themselves with the hopes of pardon. Their only
chance was boldly to follow up the blow, and, by success, to
place themselves in so formidable an attitude as to excite the
apprehensions of government. The dread of its too potent vassal
might extort terms that would never be conceded to his prayers.
But Almagro and his followers shrunk from this open collision
with the Crown. They had taken up rebellion because it lay in
their path, not because they had wished it. They had meant only
to avenge their personal wrongs on Pizarro, and not to defy the
royal authority. When, therefore, some on the more resolute, who
followed things fearlessly to their consequences, proposed to
march at once against Vaca de Castro, and, by striking at the
head, settle the contest by a blow, it was almost universally
rejected; and it was not till after long debate that it was
finally determined to move against Holguin, and cut off his
communication with Alonso de Alvarado.
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